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Abstract—Auction-based spectrum sharing is a promising
solution to improve the spectrum utilization in 5G networks.
Along with the spatial reuse, we observe that the ability to
adjust the coverage of a spectrum bidder can provide room to
itself for further negotiation while auctioning. In this work, we
propose a novel economic tool, Size-Negotiable Auction Mecha-
nism (SNAM), which provides a hybrid solution between auction
and negotiation for multi-buyers sharing spectrum chunks from
a common database. Unlike existing auction-based spectrum
sharing models, each bidder of the SNAM submits its bid for
using the spectrum per unit space and a set of coverage ranges
over which the bidder is willing to pay for the spectrum. The
auctioneer then coordinates the interference areas (or coverage
negotiation) to ensure no two winners interfere with each other
while aiming to maximize the auction’s total coverage area
or revenue. In this scenario, the undirected graph used by
existing auction mechanisms fails to model the interference
among bidders. Instead, we construct a mixed interference
graph and prove that SNAM’s auctioning on the mixed graph
is truthful and individually rational. Simulation results show
that, compared with existing auction approaches, the proposed
SNAM dramatically improves the spatial efficiency, hence leads
to significantly higher seller revenue and buyer satisfaction under
various setups. Thanks to its low complexity and low overhead,
SNAM can target fine timescale trading (in minutes or hours)
with a large number of bidders and requested coverages.
Index Terms—Spectrum auction, licensed shared access, truth-
fulness, joint auction and negotiation, multi-attribute auction.
I. INTRODUCTION
RECENT years have witnessed a growing interest fromboth academia and industry in spectrum sharing for
5G networks. Trading spectrum online is considered as a
promising solution to improve the spectrum utilization. The
largest telecommunications standard bodies like the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) and the European T-
elecommunications Standardization Institute (ETSI) have been
developing future spectrum management architectures that
consider spectrum sharing as a core feature. These architec-
tures are referred to as Spectrum Access Systems (SAS) by
FCC and Licensed Shared Access (LSA) by ETSI [2] [3].
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Mobile devices can not
only use primary band,
but also the LSA band.
LSA Licensed Base station
controls mobile devices to










Fig. 1. LSA architecture. Incumbents will provide the available spectrum to
the LSA system, while the secondary base stations will be informed by the
LSA system and then bid for the spectrum.
Both SAS and LSA support to open licensed but underutilized
spectrum bands of primary/Incumbent users for secondary use.
Among network economic models, auction-based spectrum
trading has been widely used with a long lasting history.
Numerous auction-based spectrum sharing models have been
proposed. However, compared with negotiation, auction stifles
communications between the bidders and the sellers [4]. More-
over, along with the spatial reuse, we observe that the ability
to adjust the coverage of a spectrum bidder is also a unique
feature of radio spectrum, compared with general merchandise
items in conventional auctions. This distinguished character
lends bidders room for further negotiation while auctioning.
This work explores a hybrid approach between auction and
negotiation for spectrum sharing.
Unlike traditional spectrum sales that often involve a long
contracts (e.g. multi-year) and large coverage areas (e.g.,
country, cities), spectrum sharing in future networks likely
involves much shorter contracts over much smaller cover-
age areas. The number of bidders under the new spectrum
trading is likely larger than that under the traditional one
and with much more heterogeneous coverage requirements.
For secondary licensees, their requirements are based on
different deployments and transmission distances. Moreover,
with the trend of cellular densification (micro-, femto-cells),
an increasing number of base stations also makes the spectrum
market more competitive and complicated.
To accommodate the above heterogeneity, spectrum bid-
ders need to simultaneously negotiate/auction on various
features/attributes. Note that existing auction-based spectrum
sharing schemes (e.g., [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]) often only
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considered bidders’ payment. In such cases, single-attribute
auctions were often recruited and proved to be an efficient tool
(with regards to both economic- and operation- robustness). In
this work, to account for coverage negotiation (in addition to
the payment), we design a multi-attribute auction mechanism
[11] so that both payments and coverage ranges for auction
winners can be determined.
To facilitate the interference coordination/negotiation at the
auctioneer, a graph whose vertices represent bidders and
edges represent interference between them (i.e., those can’t
co-exist) is often used (e.g., [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]). In such
a graph, vertices/bidders of any independent set/group can
simultaneously share the spectrum. However, the undirected
graph which was used in all these existing works fails to
model the interference among base stations who bid with a
set of different coverage sizes. In fact, the mutual interference
between any two bidders should be measured at multiple
levels rather than only as a binary “yes” or “no” (using
undirected graphs). To that end, we construct a mixed graph to
facilitate the interference negotiation among bidders. We then
prove that the winner determination problem in the formulated
multi-attribute auction is in fact NP-hard. A heuristic winner
and coverage range determination algorithm is then designed.
Note that the most relevant prior work to ours is the joint
power and channel allocation scheme [12]. However, similar
to all existing works, the authors in [12] failed to capture
the interference among bidders with variable coverages but
assumed a given conflict graph (for granted).
We incorporate the above into a spectrum sharing frame-
work called Size-Negotiable Auction Mechanism (SNAM).
Taking the LSA architecture [2] [13] shown in Fig. 1 as a
study case, spectrum allocation to all the base stations can
be managed by a centralized calculator and then the result
will be announced to all the base stations through the LSA
Controller. In terms of the auction efficiency, SNAM offers
bidders a “second chance” to shrink their coverage areas to win
a spectrum chunk. That helps to improve not only spectrum’s
spatial efficiency but also the seller revenue and the buyer
satisfaction. Our major contributions are as follows:
• We propose a novel economic tool, namely SNAM
that exploits the unique feature of radio spectrum as
a merchandise item: the bidder’s ability to adjust its
radio coverage. The tool allows the secondary bidders
to simultaneously bid in an auction and negotiate their
coverages for the spectrum chunks. Our negotiable auc-
tion mechanism is inspired by the empirical analysis and
comparison of auction and negotiation in economics [4].
• To facilitate the negotiation of bidders in SNAM, we
construct a mixed graph to better quantify the interference
between spectrum licensees. To our best knowledge, this
is the first effort to model the interference problem of
spectrum auction using a mixed graph approach. Shrink-
ing the coverage can improve the buyer satisfaction while
not harming the seller revenue.
• SNAM is proved to be truthful and individually rational.
Intensive simulations show that by better coordinating
coverage regions of bidders, SNAM significantly im-
proves the spectrum’s spatial efficiency. That leads to
dramatic improvement of the seller revenue and buyer
satisfaction. The auction’s truthfulness is achieved at the
cost of the revenue. However, we design a novel grouping
process that guarantees the truthfulness with a lower cost
than those in the literature, e.g., [6] [7] [14].
• The winner determination and payment rule in SNAM
relies on the bid per unit space and coverage area. This
gives small bidders/firms who request small coverage
areas a fair ground to compete with large bidders like
Mobile Network Operators (MNOs).
In Section II, we present challenges in spectrum shar-
ing market, the problem formulation, and bid processing.
In Section III, we formally describe the details of SNAM.
An example is illustrated in Section IV. The properties and
complexity of SNAM are analysed in Section V. In Section
VI, simulation results are shown and discussed. Related works
are reviewed in Section VII. Conclusion and future work are
finally summarized in Section VIII.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Challenges
Incomplete information: The potential interested base s-
tations could come from different MNOs. Due to security or
privacy considerations complete information in the market is
not possible. Hence they rely on LSA/SAS to coordinate the
interference.
Economic properties: In auction design, truthfulness is
considered important because it can avoid bid manipulation
where a bidder may cheat by declaring an untruthful bid
instead of a true valuation for the purpose of gaining a higher
utility. Another economic property is individual rationality that
can guarantee everyone in the auction cannot get a negative
utility, which is equal to its valuation minus payment.
Spatial efficiency. Besides the economic properties, the
spectrum auction should also consider the spatial efficiency. A
conflict graph is widely used to allocate spectrum, but the con-
struction of a graph and the graph processing have significant
influences on the allocation performance. An undirected graph
fails to capture the heterogeneity in coverage sizes of spectrum
bidders. Furthermore, the base stations can shrink/negotiate
their coverages and to win (“gaining a smaller pie is better
than losing everything”), thus improving the spectral spatial
efficiency.
B. Problem Model
We consider a single-round sealed auction in which N base
stations play as bidders who bid for a set of {1, 2, ...,M}
identical spectrum chunks from the auctioneer, i.e., spectrum
sharing systems of LSA or SAS. Due to the privacy/security
issue each buyer has no knowledge of the others, the auction-
eer has to coordinate the interference between them. For that
purpose, every base station should also report its geolocation.
Let (li, ri, bi) denote bidder i’s bid profile, where li is its
location, ri is the set of requested coverage ranges and bi is
the bid for each unit space (e.g., $ per square meter).
Each base station registers K alternative coverage ranges,
denoted as ri = (ri1, ri2, . . . , riK). In existing works [9-23],
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K=1 and the interference status between any two bidders
is modeled in a binary manner: “yes” (i.e., cannot simul-
taneously share a band) or “no” (i.e., can simultaneously
share). To ease the exposition when K is large, we assume
each bidder has two options for its requested coverages (i.e.,
K=2). Specifically, a base station can customize an alterna-
tive smaller interference-free range as a negotiable size if
the original (large) coverage conflicts with others. Formally,






which captures the flexibility of bidders in negotiating their
coverages. In two extreme conditions, when θi=1 (or K=1),
no bidder wants to negotiate its coverage, and when θi is close
to zero the bidder shrinks the range very much.
We emphasize that SNAM is rooted from recently proposed
spectrum sharing architectures by FCC and ETSI. The con-
cept of coverage area in SNAM is inspired by the practical
definitions of protection and exclusion zone in LSA [2]
and SAS [3]. Note that in a region, as the distribution of
users/customers can follow any rule (e.g., uniform or normal
distribution), a buyer/bidder does not have to bid for a large
area when the buyers are concentrated in a small area. The
requested coverage range set depends on the buyer’s individual
conditions and strategies.
Let (m, γi, pi) denote the determined result of bidder i,
where pi is the payment of spectrum chunk m ∈ {1, 2, ...,M},
within the interference-free range γi ∈ {0, ri1, ri2}. When
γi = 0, bidder i loses with payment pi = 0, and when γi = ri1
bidder i can use the large coverage, while γi = ri2, bidder
i has to shrink its coverage range with a lower satisfaction,






∈ {0, θ2i , 1}. (1)





Assume that buyer i’s true valuation of a spectrum chunk
per unit space is vi (e.g., $ per square meter) that depends
on its business efficacy and criticality of having the spec-
trum chunk (one may refer to [15] for the spectrum’s value
determination). Note that the true valuation vi of bidder i,
while using a winning spectrum chunk, is assessed on the
bidder’s effective area/coverage Ai. The effective coverage
(a private information) defines the maximum coverage over
which a bidder can capitalize from using the spectrum chunk.
Beyond this effective area, the valuation vanishes (i.e., vi = 0)
as additional coverage is neither profitable (e.g., desserts or
jungles where no user/demand/traffic presents) nor possible
(e.g., due to network planning or hardware/base-station or
transmit-power regulation limit).
Let Ui denote buyer i’s utility and it can be written as
Ui(ri, bi) = vi min(γ
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i π,Ai)− pi (3)
which is the difference between the value capitalized by
using a spectrum chunk and the buyer’s payment. Here, we
assume that with additional spectrum chunks, the base station’s
capacity can be nearly linearly expanded (w.r.t to spectrum
bandwidth). Additionally, the coverage area of a base station
is determined via its transmit power which can be flexibly
tuned with various power control mechanisms.
Although the utility model in (3) is simple, it is sufficient
for us to capture two facts. First, the utility function is the
difference of the revenue and the cost of the spectrum over
the granted coverage. Second, the utility function is non-
decreasing w.r.t. the granted coverage area. In our work, to
focus on the coverage negotiation (the major contribution of
SNAM), we adopt a simple model from prior works in [6]
[14]. In practice, SNAM can adopt any utility model that can
be written in the form of (3) with the above two properties.
Let M denote the allocation mechanism, and we have
(m, γi, pi) =M(bi, ri, li, b−i, r−i, l−i) (4)
where −i denotes all the bidders except bidder i.
In this paper, the mechanism is evaluated from the following
criterion:
• Individual rationality [6] [7] [14]: under the allocation
mechanism M the utility Ui(ri, bi) of a bidder i should
be non-negative, Ui(ri, bi) ≥ 0.
• Truthfulness [6] [7] [14]: a bidder cannot improve its util-
ity by submitting a cheating bid, Ui(ri, vi) ≥ Ui(r′i, bi).
• Spatial efficiency: the total coverage area realized by each
spectrum chunk. We originally introduce to measure the
performance of a spectrum allocation algorithm in terms








• Buyer satisfaction: it is defined as the ratio of the number
of winners to the total requesting buyers [6] [7]. It is used
to measure how much a spectrum allocation mechanism






• Seller revenue: it is the capital gain of the spectrum
owner for trading his/her spectrum, a concept used in






The bid processing involves information exchanging and
decision making between the LSA Repository/Controller and
the sealed bids from different base stations, as shown in Fig. 2.
As a direct access point, a base station plays an important role
in managing mobile devices and allocating resource to them.
Therefore, we suggest that the available spectrum chunk is
first allocated to a base station, then the base station further
serves its customers.
SNAM can be fitted directly on the existing LTE systems,
where a base station can register its bid request/profile via the
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Access to LSA spectrum chunk
Idle spectrum chunk(s)
[F1] Broadcast the available spectrum with details,
according to the information from repository
[F2] Each interested base station reports its bid profile
(l, r, b), namely location, range set and bid in unit space
[F3] Controller: Winner determination/payment,
authorize the winning base stations
[F4] Allocate resource blocks within LSA
spectrum chunk to terminal users
Withdraw spectrum chunk(s)
[F5] If mobile users move out of this area
[F6] Withdraw LSA resource blocks And let
mobile user switch back to primary band
[F7] Time is up for this LSA spectrum chunk /
Withdraw the spectrum from the base stations
[F9] Turn off command confirmation / Update new
available unit information
Withdraw LSA spectrum chunk
[F8] Vacate LSA band and switch to primary band
Fig. 2. Bid processing: Incumbents will update their available spectrum information to the repository and then the interested base stations will bid for the
spectrum and submit their bid profiles. If a base station wins it can provide its users/customers with shared licensed access.
interface X1 through the Evolved Packet Core (EPC) and IP
Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) [18] to the auctioneer controller.
The very mild communication overheads could be put in a
message packet that contains one bid tuple as (l, r, b) from
each bidder and one determination result tuple as (m, γ, p)
from an auctioneer controller.
SNAM targets fine timescale auctioning. Specifically, the
customer flow during a period of time in a weekend or
weekday is predictable. If a base station wins the spectrum,
then these venues can provide good services. We suggest that
SNAM runs hourly (but can be at a finer level as well).
Information broadcast: In the LSA framework we assume
that Incumbents will update the information about their avail-
able spectrum chunks in the LSA Repository. This can be
broadcasted by the LSA Controller to all the base stations in
that region.
Bid submission: After receiving the available information
each base station will then decide the bid profile, including
the coverage range set and bid based on its terrestrial property,
business plan, RF plan, and other technical aspects.
Winner determination and result announcement: as
aforementioned, the undirected graph-based auction is inappli-
cable in our case. To accommodate the coverage negotiation, in
our work, we construct a mixed graph G = (V, E), represented
by an adjacency matrix G, to let the auctioneer make the
allocation decision aiming to improve the spatial efficiency
and at the same time guarantee that the auction is economic-




As aforementioned, unlike previous undirected graph based
schemes [6] [7] [8] [14], the mixed graph in SNAM can
quantify interference into five levels instead of two (“yes” or
“no”). We model the coverage area as a circle and use the
relative positions of the two circles to measure the interference
conditions. By comparing the relationship between the sum of
TABLE I
FIVE LEVELS OF INTERFERENCE
Level Positions Graph Explanation
1 i j ji
Extremely High. Two BSs are
too close to make any
concession. Gij = 0, Gji = 0.
2 i j ji
Simultaneous concessions.
BS i and j have to make
concessions at the same
time. Gij = −1, Gji = −1.
3 i j ji
Only one concession. BS
i uses a small range while
BS j uses a large one.
Gij = −1, Gji = 1.
4 i j
ji
Either concession. Need a
further determination.
Gij = 1, Gji = −1;
or Gij = −1, Gji = 1.
5 i j ji
No concessions. BS i and j are
far away from each other. They
can share the same spectrum.
Gij = 1, Gji = 1.
the radii and the distance between the centres of the circles,
we can quantify the interference as one of five distinct levels,
as shown in Table I. For any two bidders i and j which are
dij apart, their mutual interference is quantified from Level 1
to Level 5 using the below inequalities (8)-(12):
Level 1: dij < ri2 + rj2 (8)
Level 2: ri2 + rj2 ≤ dij < min(ri1 + rj2, ri2 + rj1) (9)
Level 3: min(ri1 + rj2, ri2 + rj1) ≤
dij < max(ri1 + rj2, ri2 + rj1)
(10)
Level 4: max(ri1 + rj2, ri2 + rj1) ≤ dij < ri1 + rj1 (11)
Level 5: dij ≥ ri1 + rj1 (12)
From Level 1 to Level 5, the mutual interference decreases
from extremely high to none. In Table I, for Level 1, a plain
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line between the two nodes denotes that interference is so
severe that even at their lowest transmit powers, both of them
can not operate simultaneously. In Level 2, a double-headed
arrow between the two nodes denotes that both of them have to
make a concession if they want to win. If one node is pointed
by a single-headed arrow, it has to make a concession, but the
other one does not need to, as shown in Level 3. Two single-
headed arrows denote that either of the base stations has to
make a concession, as shown in Level 4. In this case, the
winner will be further determined by comparing their overall
area. In Level 5, if there is no edge between two nodes, it
means that the two base stations can simultaneously share the
same spectrum chunk using their large ranges.
Note that the distance-based interference model is only used
for the purpose of constructing the mixed interference graph.
In practice, our coverage negotiation auction mechanism S-
NAM can adopt any mixed interference graph as the input,
regardless of which interference model is used. In other words,
SNAM can accommodate any interference model that is used
to construct a mixed interference graph. For example, in the
spectrum sharing frameworks SAS (proposed by FCC) and
LSA (proposed by ETSI), the interference between Incumbents
and other tiers are captured through the concepts of protection
and exclusion zones [2] [3].
B. Constructing a Mixed Graph
The auctioneer generates a mixed graph G by using the
above definition of bidders’ mutual interference levels. Ev-
ery interference level corresponds to either a directed or an
undirected edge. Each element Gij in the adjacency matrix G
adopts a value in {0, 1,−1}. Specifically, Gii =1 to capture
the fact that a node adjacent to itself and do not interfere to
itself by using a large range. Moreover, every node has three
possible interference statuses to the others (j 6= i): Gij=1
denotes that base station i can use a large range relative to that
of base station j; Gij=-1 denotes that base station i should use
a small one relative to that of base station j; Gij=0 denotes
that base station i interferes to base station j seriously. Table
I specifies how the auctioneer maps the five levels of mutual
interference to the adjacency matrix G.
Additionally, Level 4 still needs a further judgement, de-
pending on their area summation. If
r2i1 + r
2
j2 ≥ r2i2 + r2j1, (13)
then bidder i will use the large area while bidder j uses the
small area. Note that even when K is greater than 2, the key
point is to maximize the overall coverages of any two buyers.
The algorithm for mixed graph construction is described in
Algorithm 1 and its complexity is stated as follows.
Theorem 1: For N bidders of which each submits K cover-
age ranges, the complexity of constructing their corresponding
mixed interference graph is O((KN)2).
Proof : In Algorithm 1, it first needs to determine all possible
interference levels between two bidders (the “switch” loop),
resulting O(K2) complexity. There are two outer “for” loops
that explore all bidders with complexity of O(N(N−1)/2) =
O(N2). Hence, the combined complexity of the 3 loops to
construct the mixed interference graph is O((KN)2). 
Algorithm 1 Construct a mixed graph
Input: Bid profiles of N bidders
Output: Interference Mixed Graph: the adjacency matrix G
1: for i=1:N do
2: Gii ← 1
3: for j=(i+ 1):N do
4: Check the interference Level between base station
i and j by (8) - (12).
5: Switch Level
6: case 1: Gij ← 0, Gji ← 0
7: case 2: Gij ← −1, Gji ← −1
8: case 3: Gij ←1,Gji ←-1 or Gij ←-1,Gji ← 1
9: case 4: Gij ← ∓1, Gji ← ±1 determined by (13)





An ideal auction mechanism should simultaneously max-
imize the revenue and maintain its economic robustness.
Assuming that the bidders are truthful in revealing their
valuations of the spectrum, the spectrum allocation problem
is to assign the spectrum to independent nodes so that the
revenue is maximized while no two bidders mutually interfere
with each other. We first show that finding the independent
nodes to form groups is NP-hard.
Theorem 2: The spectrum allocation problem that maxi-
mizes the total revenue in (7) under interference constraints is
NP-hard.
Proof : We assume that the above spectrum allocation prob-
lem is not NP-hard. Hence, for the special case θ = 1 in which
the mixed graph that we constructed becomes an undirected
graph, there exists a polynomial time solution to maximum
weighted independent set of the undirected graph [19]. That
contradicts to the fact that maximum weighted independent set
is an NP-hard problem [20]. 
Not only does the NP-hardness of the spectrum allocation
problem make the winner determination challenging but also
the strategic actions of the bidders who may not be truthful
in revealing their valuations. However, to achieve the revenue
maximization and truthfulness simultaneously is impossible,
because to guarantee the truthfulness the pricing should be
independent of its own bid but based on the harm they cause
to other bidders [21] [22]. For example, in the second price
auction, the highest bidder pays as much as the second highest
bid, and the difference between the highest bid and second
highest bid is the loss to guarantee the truthfulness. In the
following, we propose a winner determination mechanism that
aims to find a better trade-off between revenue maximization
and auction truthfulness.
Unlike conventional merchandise, spectrum can be reused
simultaneously by a group of bidders who do not interfere
with each other. Such a group of bidders corresponds to
a group of vertices of which any two nodes xi, xj ∈ V
have no edge between them. Each group will be treated as
a super bidder in the following spectrum allocation, then the
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immediate questions are (i) how to group these nodes, (ii) how
to determine the group bid, and (iii) how much to charge each
member in a group. Notationally, the nodes are grouped as
Ω1,Ω2, . . . ,ΩL, and let ΩBl denote the group bid of group l.
The following are three steps to iteratively form groups and
the algorithm is shown in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Winner determination
Input: Adjacency matrix G, number of available spectrum
chunks M and bids {bi}
Output: Groups{Ωl}, payments{pi}, determined ranges{γi}
1: l = 0
2: while 0 ∈ G or |G| > 1 do
3: G′ ← G
4: l← l + 1
5: while 0 ∈ G′ do
6: delete the higher degree node from G′
7: end while
8: for i = 1 : |G′| do
9: if ∃j with G′ij = −1 then
10: γi ← ri2
11: else if only if ∀j,G′ij = 1
12: γi ← ri1
13: end if
14: end for
15: put the remaining nodes in group Ω̂l
16: find out the minimum bid in group Ω̂l: Blα ←
min(Bl1, B
l
2, . . . , B
l
n) (using (2))
17: abandon the minimum bid in group: Ωl ← Ω̂l\α
18: calculate the bid of group l: ΩBl = |Ωl|Blα
19: remove Ωl from G
20: end while
21: L = l
22: pick up the min(L,M) highest group-bid (ΩBl ) groups as
winning groups and allocate each group with one spectrum
chunk m
23: the bidders in the same winning group Ωl will equally
share the group bid ΩBl , as much as pi ← Blα
24: set the losers’ payment pi = 0, γi = 0
25: return {Ωl}, {pi}, {γi}, m
Step 1: Dropping seriously interfering bidders.
First of all, to make sure all the bidders in a group can coexist,
the node that Gij = 0 should be dropped iteratively. Those
bidders who seriously interfere (in Level 1) to the others are
dropped from the mixed graph and the higher degree will
be dropped first. For example, if an edge eij = (xi, xj) is
0, and bidder i’s degree deg(xi) is higher than bidder j’s
deg(xj), bidder i is dropped. This is because a bidder with
higher degree interferes to more neighbouring bidders. Those
dropped nodes will be put forward to the next iteration.
Step 2: Interference-free area judgement.
After above processing, it is possible that bidder i can use a
large range to bidder j but has to use a small range to base
station k, namely Gij = 1, Gik = −1. Consider the overall
friendly sharing environment, one has to adopt the small range
to all the neighbouring bidders. For example, in Fig. 3, Gij is
forced to be −1. Therefore the determined range of bidder i
j i k j i k
Fig. 3. The bidder i’s range will be forced to shrink.
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Fig. 4. In TRUST, winners pay as the second highest group bid, the revenue
loss is the difference between the 1st and 2nd highest group bid. In SMALL,
winners equally share the group bid, but the minimum bid in the group will
be sacrificed and the nodes’ space is wasted. In SNAM, in every iteration the
minimum bid is not sacrificed but moved into next iteration.
is γi = ri2, if ∃j, Gij = −1; and otherwise, γi = ri1, if and
only if ∀j, Gij = 1.
Step 3: Group bid calculation.
Since the ranges of bidders are determined, then the to-
tal bid of a bidder in group is easy to get. If there are
n nodes in a group Ω̂l and let {Bl1, Bl2, . . . , Bln} denote





2, . . . , B
l
n). All the nodes are independent
and can coexist, and the minimum bidder α will be treated as
the benchmark Blα but be abandoned. The remaining nodes
automatically form a group Ωl = Ω̂l\α, and the group bid is:
ΩBl = |Ωl|Blα (14)
where |Ωl| is the size (number of nodes) of the group. All
the nodes that are abandoned (in Step 1 and 3) will be moved
into the next iteration of the group formation. The next group
will be formed by repeating Step 1, 2, and 3. The grouping
process continues until only one node left.
To facilitate the truthfulness of bidders in an auction, the
winning buyer’s payment should be made independently from
its bids [23]. Therefore, in the above, we abandon the mini-
mum bidder (the dependent bidder), or the benchmark node.
However, we observe that either abandoning the minimum
bidders in all the groups e.g., [14] or abandoning the entire
group with the lowest group bid e.g., [6] would cause a large
loss in both revenue and spectrum’s spatial efficiency. Hence,
instead of removing them completely, in SNAM, we “recycle”
the benchmark nodes by putting the loss into each iteration,
and then put the minimum ones to the next iteration. Finally,
only one bidder is sacrificed, as shown in Fig. 4.
Step 4: Final winner determination.
After all the nodes are formed into groups Ω1,Ω2, . . . ,ΩL, the
min(L,M) highest groups win and each member in the same
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group will equally share their own group bids. Specifically,
for buyer i in a winning group Ωl, its payment pi is given as:
pi = Ω
B
l /|Ωl| = Blα. (15)
Note that if M > L, then bidders who are in need of
additional spectrum can join another auction for the rest of
M − L spectrum chunks. Additionally, although SNAM is
a single-round auction with multiple (M ) identical spectrum
chunks, it can also accommodate the case of heterogeneous
spectrum chunks. In such a case, we can simply set the number
of available chunks M = 1 (i.e., trading with one chunk at
a time). The following chunks are then traded in the next
auctions.
SNAM targets fine timescale auctioning. The auction can
start as early as there is a demand and an ideal spectrum chunk
is registered for reuse. In Section V, we show that SNAM’s
complexity is polynomial w.r.t. the number of bidders and the
number of requested range. Such a low complexity enables it
to be implemented in a very fine timescale (e.g., hours or even
minutes).
From the winning determination, we can observe that S-
NAM can provide small and large firms likely equal oppor-
tunity to access the spectrum by considering their coverage
requests. In fact, SNAM aims to maximize the total revenue
through improving the overall coverage, instead of directly
maximizing the revenue. Specifically, from the group bid
calculation, SNAM favors to accommodate a higher number of
buyers other than a single or few buyers with large coverage.
Additionally, the winner determination and payment rule in
SNAM relies on the bid per unit space and coverage of the
least competitive bidder (the benchmark) other than the total
payment. This gives small bidders/firms who request small
coverage areas a quite fair ground to compete with larger ones.
IV. AN EXAMPLE
In this section we provide a simple example to demonstrate
SNAM. Assume that one seller registers an available spectrum
chunk in the geolocation database in a region, where there are
five buyers {A,B,C,D,E} with bids and negotiable ranges
listed in Fig. 5. In this example, we compare the significant
differences between SNAM and the undirected graph based
approaches TRUST [6] and SMALL [14].
In Fig. 6, we present how these five nodes are forms in
groups under TRUST and SMALL. The conflict graph in Fig.
6(a) is modeled as all the base stations using large ranges.
Under TRUST, the group bid is defined as the lowest bid
multiplied by the group size, |Ωl|min(Ωl). TRUST’s payment
rule is that the winning groups will pay as much as the highest
losing group. For instance, the winning group is {B D}, and
they altogether pay 228.91 as much as group {E}. Since there
are two winners out of five bidders, the buyer satisfaction
under TRUST is 40%. On the other hand, SMALL’s group
bid is defined as the lowest bid multiplied by the group size
minus one, (|Ωl| − 1) min(Ωl), and the payment rule is that
winners will equally share the group bid. The revenue, spatial
efficiency and buyer satisfaction are given in Fig. 10.
SNAM lets each base station have a different negotiable






(a) Five base stations’ requirements for licensed areas.
A B C D E
bid/unit 0.8 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.9
r1 12 10 7 8 9
r2 10.2 7 5.6 6.8 8.1
ratio 0.85 0.7 0.8 0.85 0.9
Bi, γ=r1 361.73 157 107.7 160.77 228.91
Bi, γ=r2 261.35 76.93 68.93 116.15 185.41
(b) Bid profiles of five base stations




Group Min bid Group bid Winner(s)
AC 107.7 215.40
BD 157 314 BD
E 228.91 228.91
TRUST
(b) Allocation result under TRUST
Group Min bid Group bid Winner(s)
AC 107.70 107.70
BD 157 157 D
E 228.91 0
SMALL
(c) Allocation result under SMALL










































Fig. 7. Construction of a mixed graph. The pointed nodes need to shrink
while the pointing nodes can use large range. (a) the edge between any two
nodes can be constructed as Table I; (b) For nodes C and D in Level 4, a
further decision is needed by (13); (c) adjacency matrix G.
the mixed graph and its adjacency matrix for the bidders. The
initial mixed graph is shown in Fig. 7(a), then for node C and
D, according to the further determination of the Interference
Level 4 in (13), the mixed graph turns into Fig. 7(b), because






D1 node C uses small range. Fig.
8 provides the SNAM’s grouping process, Fig. 9 lists the
calculation of group bid, and Fig. 10 visually shows the
comparison of the allocation results. The pink circle is the
benchmark node, green circles are winners, and particularly,



















Fig. 8. Group formation: (a) Group 1: Dropping seriously interfering and high
degree bidder D; (b) Group 1: Benchmark node B is sacrificed; (c) Group
2: The dropped node D and benchmark node B are moved into a second
iteration. (d) Group 2: The last benchmark node B is sacrificed.
Buyer
A 0.8 10.2 261.3
B 0.5 7.0 76.9
C 0.7 7.0 107.7
E 0.9 8.1 185.4
   
(a)
Buyer
B 0.5 10.0 157.0
D 0.8 8.0 160.8
   
(b)
Fig. 9. Group bid calculation: (a) Group 1: {A,C,E} form a group, and the
group bid ΩB1 = 76.9 ∗ 3 = 230.7; (b) Group 2: {D} itself form a group.
The last node B sacrificed, and the group bid is ΩB2 = 157 ∗ 1 = 157.
Therefore, the winning group is group 1: {A,C,E}.
SNAM TRUST SMALL
Spatial Efficiency 0.27 0.21 0.08
Buyer Satisfaction 51% 40% 20%
Seller Revenue 230.79 228.91 157
(a)
(b)
Revenue: ; Buyer Satisfaction: %; Spatial Efficiency:
(c)
Fig. 10. Comparison of allocation results of SNAM and undirected graph
based approaches. (a) Performance comparison; (b) Allocation result under
SNAM; (c) Allocation result under undirected graph based approach.
V. SNAM PROPERTIES
A. Individual Rationality
Theorem 3: SNAM is individually rational, i.e. Ui ≥ 0.
Proof: We have two cases: (a) If bidder i is a winner, its
payment is pi and is equal to the benchmark payment Blα that
is the minimum bid in group Ωl, i.e., Bi > Blα. Recalling the
utility function of bidder i, we have:






= Bi −Blα > 0.
(16)
(b) If bidder i is a loser, it is obvious that Ui = 0.
Therefore, SNAM is individually rational. 
B. Truthfulness
In the bid profile (li, ri, bi), the bidder i may manipulate
its bid per unit space bi, its location, or its requested range
of coverages to maximize its utility (defined in (3)). In the
sequel, we prove that SNAM provides a truthful auctioning
mechanism in which buyers have no incentive or are unable
to cheat on the above information.
Theorem 4: SNAM is truthful for all the bidders.
Proof: We first show that buyers should be truthful in its
coverage range. Note that each bidder has its own choice to
set its requested ranges, depending on the area over which it
can capitalize from using the spectrum (defined above as the
effective coverage area) as well as its own justification of the
risk being rejected due to a large coverage request. Hence, all
requested ranges that are within the effective coverage area are
considered truthful and part of the bidder’s strategy. However,
the buyers may still cheat on the requested coverage range in
two cases:
Case 1: A buyer requests a small coverage to win the
spectrum then uses the spectrum over a larger coverage. Under
both LSA and SAS, regulations and spectrum enforcement
mechanism are assumed to be in place to enforce bidders to
abide with its requested coverages (e.g., using the environment
sensing capability ESC in SAS [24], [25]). Interested readers
are also referred to [26] [27] for similar spectrum monitoring
approaches. Hence, a bidder cannot manipulate its geolocation
or use the winning spectrum outside its granted range γi.
Case 2: A buyer i inflates its requested ranges r′i =





i2π > Ai. If the buyer wins the auction either with r
′
i1 or
r′i2 coverage, from the utility function in (3), we have:
U ′i(r
′
i, bi) = viAi − pi.
However, by bidding truthfully (i.e., within the effective
coverage area) with requested ranges ri = {ri1, ri2} where
ri1 = ri2 =
√
Ai/π, the buyer can attain the same utility
as above Ui = U ′i with a higher likelihood. This is because
the range/coverage inflation leads to higher risk of interfering
with others, hence increasing the risk of being removed in Step
1. On the other hand, if the buyer loses the auction with the
requested range r′i we have: U
′
i = 0 or Ui ≥ U ′i (due to the
individual rationality property). Hence, regardless of losing or
winning the auction, inflating the coverage requests beyond
the effective coverage area results in inferior utility, compared
with a truthful coverage bid.
Next, we prove that for all strategic bidders in SNAM, their
best strategy is to reveal their true type of spectrum valuation
vi. To that end, we first have the following lemmas.
Lemma 1: If a bidder wins a spectrum chunk, the bidder’s
granted range γi is independent of its own bid bi.
Proof : For any winner in a group, its granted coverage range
is adjusted in Step 1 and Step 2 of the grouping process.
In Step 1 and Step 2, when there is a conflict between
requested coverages, the bidders’ coverages are adjusted for
the coexistence with more neighbors. This criterion is only
related to the bidders’ locations and their requested coverage
but not their bids. 
Lemma 2: For any winner i, its utility is a step function of
its bid bi (or Bi) (as shown in Fig. 11).
Proof : For any winner i in the winning group Ωl, its utility
Ui = vi min(γ
2
i π,Ai) − pi depends on its payment pi = Blα





Fig. 11. The remaining bidder i’s utility is a step function of its bid bi.
payment is Blα. After a set of nodes are formed in a group,
their ranges are determined and fixed. When bidder i increases
it bid bi, even though the bidder i’s total bid Bi increases, its
payment (set by the benchmark bidder) does not change. On
the other hand, if bidder i decreases its bid which is lower than
the benchmark, then it will be the benchmark and be dropped
and put forward to the next iteration. The grouping process
in Step 3 continues. At the last iteration, if the bidder wins,
its payment is then again independent of its bid (set by the
benchmark bidder in this iteration/group), if not, its payment
is 0. 
Now, let’s assume that if buyer i bids truthfully by bi = vi
its utility is Ui with granted coverage γi and payment pi. If
it cheats by bidding b′i 6= vi, its utility is U ′i with granted
coverage γ′i and payment p
′
i. We have four cases:
(a) |γi| = 0, |γ′i| = 0: In this case, bidder i loses regardless
of cheating or not, and Ui = U ′i = 0, and there is no
motivation for buyer i to cheat.
(b) |γi| = 0, |γ′i| > 0: We first have Ui = 0. According to
Steps 1, 2 and 3 a bidder can only become a winner (from
a loser) by increasing its bid, i.e. B′i > Bi and if and only
if the bidder happens to be a benchmark (with truthful bid),
i.e., Bi = Bα (see Lemma 2). By reporting a bid b′i, the new
benchmark will be the second lowest bid B−2 (in the case
with truthful bid) that is greater than Bi. The bidder i with its
bid b′i needs to pay p
′
i = B−2 > Bi. We have:
U ′i = vi min(γ
′2
iπ,Ai)−B−2. (17)
Recalling Lemma 1, to win with bid b′i, the granted
range/coverage is determined independently of their bids, i.e.,
the granted coverage γ′i would be the same as that if the bidder
wins by bidding with bi. Hence, we have:
Bi = viγ
′2
iπ ≥ vi min(γ′
2
iπ,Ai). (18)
From (17), (18), and B−2 > Bi, we have U ′i < 0 which is
smaller than Ui = 0.
(c) |γi| > 0 and |γ′i| > 0: In this case, the cheating bid
does not change the granted coverage (see Lemma 1) and the
benchmark payment Bα stays the same, so does the payment
p′i = pi = Bα. Then we have U
′
i = Ui.
(d) |γi| > 0 and |γ′i| = 0: It is obvious that in this case
Ui > 0 and U ′i = 0, the bidder prefers to bid truthfully.
From the above analysis, Ui ≥ U ′i always stands, so
cheating can not make the bidder obtain more utility. 
C. Group Formation
Theorem 5: Along with the group formation process, the
(1) group size and (2) group bid becomes smaller statistically.
Proof : (1) With the group formation running, the number
of remaining nodes become less after each iteration, therefore
the group size is no larger than the previous group statistically.
(2) The bids are uniformly distributed, so the expectations
of bids are the same. In addition, the group bid is defined as
group size multiplied by the minimum bid in equation (14).
Therefore, if the expectations of minimum bids in every group
are the same, then the group bid is mainly contributed by the
group size. So the group bid of smaller group is lower. 
This is illustrated in Fig. 17 from Section VI.
D. Complexity Analysis
Theorem 6: For N bidders, and K levels of coverage, the
complexity of SNAM is O((K2 +N2)N2).
Proof : SNAM consists of Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2.
According to Theorem 1, the complexity of constructing a
mixed interference graph is O((KN)2). Algorithm 2 first
aims at finding the auction winners with three loops (two
whiles and one for) whose combined complexity is bounded
by O(N2(N2 +N2)). Therefore, the overall time complexity
of SNAM is bounded with O((K2 +N2)N2). 
Note that O((K2 + N2)N2) is a polynomial w.r.t. the
network size N and the number of requested ranges K.
SNAM is hence scalable with N and K (even when they
get larger). Additionally, SNAM is a single-sided auction.
The whole process includes the bid submitting and winner
determination with the complexity of O((K2 + N2)N2) and
could be completed or calculated out in time scale of second
or less. Hence, we even do not need to set a time constraint
for each auction.
VI. SIMULATION AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we will evaluate the performance of SNAM
through simulation and compare it to the undirected graph
approaches [6] [14].
A. Setup
We consider a certain region where heterogeneous base
stations scatter (under either a uniform or normal distri-
bution) in the normalized region of 1x1. To accommodate
the bidders’ heterogeneity in their coverage requests, bids
and spectrum valuation, we set parameters in our simula-





2]. Valuation of the spectrum is ran-
domly distributed in [b0,1], here, b0 is a variable and reflects
the dynamic range of bid, and b0 is studied in subsection E. To
mitigate the impact of randomness, we run SNAM for 10000
times in MATLAB to evaluate its performance.
B. Comparison to the Existing Works
At first, one visual allocation result is shown in Fig. 12, and
the number of base stations is N=50. The initial interference-
free area requirements are shown in Fig. 12(a). The dark green
circle denotes the shrinking area; the pink circle denotes the
deleted benchmark node for truthfulness guarantee; and the
light green circles denote the nodes without any concession
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in Fig. 12(c). It is obvious that the overall allocated area
under SNAM is larger than that under the undirected graph
auction. So SNAM can improve spatial efficiency because
of the negotiation mechanism. Besides the spatial efficiency,
shrinking coverages also allows more base stations to access
extra shared spectrum, which brings a higher revenue and
buyer satisfaction.
We first compare SNAM with the Pure Allocation (PA) algo-
rithm. Due to its NP-hardness, we run PA on scenarios with a
decent number of bidders 10,15, and 20 so that the exhaustive
search method can be affordable. Note that although PA can
provide the highest revenue, it is extremely time-consuming
and generally not affordable for a large number of bidders.
As can be seen in Fig. 13, SNAM can achieve more than
87% revenue of PA. Moreover, SNAM yields slightly higher
buyer satisfaction over PA. It worth noting that under SNAM
the spectrum’s spatial efficiency is dramatically improved,
compared with PA. This is thanks to the negotiations of
bidders in adjusting their coverages, thus improving the spatial
efficiency and accommodate more buyers. The heavier the
network congestion is, the more apparent this advantage of
the ability to adjust the coverage becomes.
We also compare SNAM to the existing work TRUST [6]
and SMALL [14]. We let all the bidders randomly set their
range ratio between [θ0, 1], and for the SMALL and TRUST
the ratio is always 1. When θ0 varies from 0.1 to 1, the
comparisons are shown in Fig. 14. Setting the shrinking ratio
too small is neither practical nor beneficial. When the ratio is
set greater than 0.8, SNAM performs better than SMALL and
TRUST in terms of spatial efficiency, buyer satisfaction and
seller revenue. This is because if the ratio is small, the total
bid of a bidder is also small and it always is treated as the
benchmark and be abandoned in the group formation iteration.
The loss of the revenue is related to the payment rule.
Everyone’s payment depends on the benchmark of the group,
therefore, the difference between their total bid Bi and bench-
mark bid Blα is the revenue loss.
C. Impact of Network Density and Range Ratio
Next, we examine the performance of SNAM in different
kinds of networks in single-unit auction when the number of
bidders varies from 50 to 500 and ratio varies from 0.1 to 1,
as shown in Fig. 15. Here we try to find out the best ratio
while varying the bidder density. It is obvious that no matter
how many bidders participate the auction, setting the ratio
between [0.85 0.95] is the dominant strategy for the bidders,
which means that the bidders can achieve the highest buyer
satisfaction and for sellers, they can get highest revenue.
D. Dynamic Range of Bid Distribution
Bid distribution is defined as in [6] [7] to capture the
heterogeneity of the bids made by all buyers. Without losing
the generality, in the paper, we assume the bid distribution is
uniform across all bidders. From the payment rule in equation
(14), we can find that how much one winner pays depends on
the minimum bid in a group (benchmark). To examine how
the bid distribution effects the revenue, we set the number of
bidders N=100, and the bid distribution is over [b0, 1]. When
b0 is small, the dynamic bid range is large. Because when the
dynamic range of bid becomes smaller, the difference between
the minimum bid and the other bid in a group becomes smaller.
As shown in Fig. 16, SNAM’s degradation over SMALL and
TRUST becomes smaller when b0 is less than 0.4 in terms of
revenue, but the revenue becomes higher and higher from 0.4
to 1. However, the spatial efficiency and buyer satisfaction are
always much better than SMALL and TRUST.
E. The Group Formation
The feature that allows the bidder with an alternative range
makes the groups formed under SNAM accommodate more
bidders. The benchmark node of group will directly affect the
performance. Since the bid, location and range are distributed
in the same domain for all the bidders, the expectations of





2π] =, . . . ,= E[bNγ
2
Nπ]. (19)
E[B1] = E[B2] =, . . . ,= E[Bn]. (20)
However, during the group formation process, we also find
the size of first formed group is no smaller than the later ones,
recalling Theorem 5, which can be expressed as
Pr(|Ωl| > |Ωl+1|) > Pr(|Ωl| < |Ωl+1|). (21)
Expectations of benchmarks are the same because of (20),
therefore the expectation of group bid should be
E[B1α] ≥ E[B2α] ≥, . . . ,≥ E[Blα]. (22)
As shown in Fig. 17, the first few group groups formed
under SNAM have a higher number of members and larger
total area. The number of groups under SNAM is less or
the grouping process ends up quickly. Therefore, the group
formation speed of SNAM is faster than TRUST and SMALL
who use the same grouping scheme.
As a result, in a congested spectrum market, when the
number of available spectrum chunks M is small (M  N ),
the spatial efficiency, seller revenue and buyer satisfaction
under SNAM are better than TRUST or SMALL. Along with
the increment of M , the difference between them becomes
smaller, and finally the revenue turns equal, as shown in Fig.
19 (c).
Fig. 18 compares the seller revenue and buyer satisfaction
under different bidder distributions. As can be seen, under
the uniform distribution, the seller revenue and the buyer
satisfaction are higher than those under the normal distribution.
This is because under the normal bidder distribution, the
nodes/bidders are crowded around the center, making the
interference more severe. That leads to the lower revenue and
the lower buyer satisfaction.
VII. RELATED WORKS
The traditional manual auction for spectrum allocation is
no longer suitable and efficient for dynamic spectrum access
systems, such as LSA and SAS. Spectrum sharing between

















Fig. 12. A visual allocation result comparison. (a) Base stations are uniformly distributed in a region and each has two options of interference-free range; (b)
allocation result based on SMALL [14] the large range is considered as the interference-free range and the pink circle is the sacrificed node; (c) allocation



































































Fig. 13. Comparison of SNAM’s performance with PA.






























































Fig. 14. When the ratio is set from [θ0,1], SNAM performs best over θ0 ∈[0.8,1]. Because too much shrinking the coverage makes bidder’s total bid low
and leads to losing in a group. If shrinking ratio is set greater than 0.8, the buyer satisfaction can be improved and so are spatial efficiency and revenue.
between them but also their selfish behaviors when sharing.
Authors in [28] investigated the performance loss due to
selfish behavior under a self-enforcing protocol. [29] [30]
proposed contract-based approaches to solve the conflicting
of sharing. To accommodate the above heterogeneity, on-line
auctions based on short intervals in the time domain and small
areas in the space domain [15] have recently been proposed.
Zou et al. [31] considers an auction-based power-allocation
scheme to solve power competition of multiple secondary
users but cannot guarantee truthful behaviors. Sodagari et al.
[10] presented a truthful spectrum auction mechanism but does
not consider spatial re-usability of the spectrum. In [6] [14] the
proposed double auction mechanisms achieve not only spatial
re-usability in geolocation by grouping bidders but also have
an anti-cheating property through a proper choice of winner
determination and payment rule. However, the coverage of
the base station is not taken into account. Researchers in
[7] [8] [17] proposed mechanisms of truthful double auction
for heterogeneous spectrum which considers heterogeneity
factors in frequency but not in ranges/coverages. Yang and
Lin et al. [32] [33] very recently proposed a group buying-
based spectrum auction to provide small firms with more
12
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 15. Impact of network density and ratio. (a) When the number of bidders in a certain region varies from 50 to 500, the spatial efficiency can reach
the maximal when the ratio is around [0.85, 0.95]; (b) When there are more bidders in an auction, the average buyer satisfaction is low, however, the buyer
satisfaction is better when the ratio is around [0.85, 0.95]; (c) Accordingly, the revenue is better if ratio is set in [0.85, 0.95].































































Fig. 16. The impact of bid distribution. If the dynamic range of bid distribution is large, then the minimum bid will hold back the group bid, so the revenue
loss to guarantee the truthfulness is more.




















































































Fig. 17. The first few groups formed under SNAM are bigger than those
under TRUST/SMALL in both uniform and normal distributions.
opportunities in case that they cannot afford an entire spectrum
chunk in a large region. Another significant issue is the privacy,
for example, Li et al. in [5] presented PPER to protect users’
bid privacy but the bidders are terminal user pairs rather than
base stations. DEAR in [9] achieves approximate truthfulness,











































Fig. 18. Performance comparisons of the seller revenue and the buyer
satisfaction under different bidder distributions.
distributed in homogeneous conventional hexagons, while in
future spectrum market, base stations from different MNOs
are heterogeneous and arbitrarily distributed.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We presented a hybrid approach of auction and negotiation
for spectrum sharing, namely SNAM. Unlike all existing
auction-based spectrum sharing models in the literature that
stifles the communications between the seller and buyers,
SNAM provides a channel for the seller and its buyers to
13































































Fig. 19. Impact of number of available spectrum chunks. SNAM has a more obvious advantage when the number of available spectrum chunks is less.
further negotiate their coverages. Considering the spatial effi-
ciency in a licensed shared spectrum scenario, the mixed graph
lets base stations from different operators make concessions
when interference happens. Merging the area shrinking into
the grouping process can reduce the number of iterations and
also improve the spatial efficiency and buyer satisfaction, thus
contributing to a higher revenue. That is a main difference
to the existing works that form bidder groups based on only
the undirected interference graph. As a result, our approach
can accommodate more base stations thus providing a fair
competition environment for small firms competing with large
firms for spectrum. Based on the analysis of the simulation
results, the importance of the large to small radius ratio for d-
ifferent sizes of the interference-free area can be observed. We
also prove that the proposed auction mechanism preserves the
economic properties of individual rationality and truthfulness.
Overall in the heterogeneous multiple NMOs’ networks, the
proposed mechanism performs better than the undirected graph
based auction in terms of spatial efficiency, seller revenue and
buyer satisfaction.
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